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Abstract
This chapter was a theoretical construct on corruption within the context of
long-run growth. It stressed and expounded the quality implications of corrupt
practices for full capacity output. Rational behavior of economic agents was
assumed and the typical capitalist economy was the setting. The ultimate channel of
the effect of corruption on long-run growth was a declining total factor productivity
growth that in turn caused the full information natural rate level of output to fall
below full capacity output. Both the investment and human capital transmission
mechanisms of corruptive practices were focused with trappings of institutional
corruption discernible in the two cases. Different permutations and likely results
were indicated and analyzed. The overall conclusion was that corruption was unde-
sirable from the perspective of long-run growth.
Keywords: corruption, total factor productivity growth, long-run growth,
environment and growth, public policy
JEL Codes: A11, A13, A23, 044, Z18
1. Introduction
Most studies on corruption stressed its growth penalizing impact (see, e.g.,
[1–4]). Three channels of effect were common in the literature, viz. human capital,
institutions, and investment (e.g., [5]). In the majority of cases, the short-run effect
was emphasized. However, in a recent publication, [6] developed a theoretical
model to underpin the passive understanding that corruption lowered the marginal
product of capital, hence, the growth of the economy. The channel of effect
emphasized in the study was a reduced return on investment via an arbitrary tax.
By this, corruption adversely affected the productivity (and, thus, productivity
growth) of private capital, thereby, implicitly, impacting long-run growth.1
In the present chapter, the long-run effect of corruption was emphasized. The
investment channel was retained but the route differed: investment quality rather
than tax effect was stressed. Additionally, the human capital or labor productivity
channel was developed to show that a significant fall in total factor productivity
growth would be the ultimate result of corrupt practices. In the two cases, trappings
of institutional corruption were discernible. Different permutations and likely
results were analyzed. In Section 2 of the chapter, the model was presented with a
1 Ordinarily, productivity is a level concept but, under a “continuous context” assumption, it turns into a
growth factor.
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particular discussion of its premise and general features as well as the different
possible scenarios. Section 3 provided some concluding remarks.
2. The model
2.1 The premise and general context
This model was applied to the typical capitalist economy where corrupt practices
were visible or usually exposed and thus not always hidden. The representative
agents, firms and workers, were assumed to be rational. The basic premise was that
corruption caused the full information natural level of output to fall below the full
capacity output via its productivity growth impact.2 This was depicted in Figure 1.
In the diagrammatic representation, LRAS was long-run aggregate supply curve, Y0
was full information natural rate level of output at which the aggregate demand for
and supply of labor were equal, Y* was full capacity output at which all employable
resources were fully and optimally engaged, and AD0 and AS0 were referred to
aggregate demand and supply curves, respectively.
Now, consider a typical endogenous production function such as below:
Y ¼ AKαL1α (1)
where Y was the output, A was an exogenous constant and K was stock of
physical capital and improvement to that stock from knowledge acquisition; L was
stock of human capital; and α and 1 α were respective parameters or elasticities
corresponding to K and L. The first-order condition for output maximization was
that dydk >0;
dy
dl >0.
An additional term capturing the externality from average human capital could
be incorporated into the function such that
Figure 1.
Full information level of output versus full capacity output. Source: Adapted from [7].
2 Other factors that could produce similar result include regimes of high income taxes and cost of
regulation. For further details, see [7].
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Y ¼ AKαL1αLeω (2)
where ω was a parameter/elasticity corresponding to the externality term that
was expected to positively influence output growth.
The assumption of increasing returns of the endogenous model ensured that in
steady state, changes in each of the right-hand-side variables with respect to output
continued to be positive, that is, a positive second derivative.
Corruption affected factor inputs, capital (K), and labor (L) negatively, neu-
tralizing the effect of the knowledge component of capital (K) and turning negative
the externality from human capital (LeÞ. Thus, the gains from both the stock of
knowledge and human capital development were negative somewhat, returning the
process to that of diminishing long-run returns.
The channel of effect of corruption on capital was the reduction in output
quality that lowered capital’s marginal product (MPK), hence, the average return on
capital investment. For labor, work effort declined as workers were discouraged.
Accordingly, the marginal product of labor (MPL), hence, the average return on
labor investment, fell. The sum total of these outcomes was a falling total factor
productivity growth. This translated to declining long-run output growth.
So far, the analysis had assumed perfect and full information dissemination,
situations otherwise were examined in Section 2.2.
2.2 Cases
Besides the general case discussed above, several other permutations were
possible:
a.Where corruption was widespread (endemic) and accepted as “a way of life.”
There would be no effect on labor productivity, but capital productivity (MPK)
would fall as in the general case.3 Thus, the steady-state impact would be
reduced by the extent of the nil labor productivity effect.
b.Where corruption was considered undesirable but its incidence was restricted
to the top echelon of government and there was often a time lag in labor’s
knowledge of its occurrence. In the short run, output growth would not be
adversely affected as dydk >0 and
dy
dl >0: In the long run, with perfect
information, output growth would suffer greatly as
dy
dk2
<0; dy
dl2
<0; dydle <0 and
dy
dle2
<0: Such a long-run outcome was clearly that of
double growth jeopardy.
c.Where corruption was considered undesirable and information about its
occurrence spread rapidly.4 Both the short-run and long-run effects would be
3 The prediction on labor productivity was influenced by the probability of people not feeling cheated in
the circumstance. However, the case submission might not be without qualification: to the extent that
resources meant for labor skills’ improvement were diverted or embezzled, labor’s contribution
(potential) to long-run growth would fall.
4 Cases associated with institutional corruption resulting from avoidable but sustained bureaucracy as in
business registration, licensing, permits, and kickbacks in contract awards, readily became public
knowledge. It could be argued though that the first three types of corrupt practices noted above would
only generate level effect being “a once in a firm’s lifetime payments,” the case of kickback appeared
different. The ensuing poor quality of output (firm’s products) had welfare implication and also wasted
public funds as the same contract was awarded repeatedly.
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similar as dydk <0;
dy
dl <0;
dy
dle < 0 and
dy
dk2
<0; dy
dl2
<0; dy
dle2
<0:5 Thus, rapid
information dissemination as aided by the phenomenal growth of social media
could facilitate this outcome. It could similarly constitute the missing link in
non-capitalist countries where press freedom was restricted and the growth of
social media severely circumscribed. Hence, the short-run and long-run effect
of corruptive practices associated with this particular case might be quite
different in such economies.
d.Where the representative agent (i.e., the firm) had information about the
practice prior to bidding for the contract. The contract sum would be enhanced
or increased by the extra payment made under the kickback arrangement. This
reduced the average efficiency of (hence, return on) capital, dragging down
long-run growth accordingly. Short run growth might not suffer backlash in
this case, while the effect on labor productivity depended on whether scenario
(a) or (b) also obtained. In general,
dy
dk > <0;
dy
dk2
<0; dydl and
dy
dl2
> <0; dydle and
dy
dle2
> <0:6
e.Where the representative agent had no prior information before bidding and
was compelled to make the kickback payment out of the contract sum. Most
likely, the agent, being rational, would reduce the quality of his/her product(s)
in order to recover the amount paid and also protect profit margin. This would
cause MPK and, macro-economically, the average returns to capital to fall.
Long-run growth suffered accordingly. Thus, dydk <0;
dy
dk2
<0; dydl and
dy
dl2
> <0
depending on which of scenarios (a) and (b) also applied. The short- and long-
run externality from human capital, that is, dydle and
dy
dle2
, followed the trend of
return on labor investment.
3. Concluding observations
This chapter had been concerned with the modalities of the impact of corruption
on long-run growth in respect of which the explicit literature was nonexistent. The
basic premise on which the discussion and analysis were anchored was that corrup-
tion penalized long-run growth by causing total factor productivity growth to fall.
The ultimate result was that the natural rate level of output fell below the full
capacity output.
It was thus clear from the analysis that notwithstanding the fact that an economy
experienced full employment, its long-run growth could still be endangered by
corrupt practices. However, the extent to which the basic result in this chapter was
obtained depended crucially on the circumstances of each economy especially the
state of its moral and ethical philosophy, the effectiveness of law and order, the
degree of press freedom, and the sophistication of economic agents including firms
5 This did not suggest that output would not change (grow) at all; after all, the expenditure approach to
gross national income (GNI) guaranteed a rise in nominal output from such government spending.
However, incremental addition to output would fall dragging down output (real) growth. In the long
run, with the decline in product quality properly accounted for, the fall in output could be cumulative if
not multiplicative.
6 The practice in some countries of influencing journalists’ choice/content of news feature (through
“brown envelope” or other forms of inducement) could produce an effect similar to scenario (b) or (c)
depending on the speed at which “covered corruptive practices” became public knowledge.
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and labor. Accordingly, five scenarios of different possible permutations were
identified and analyzed. The consensus from this exercise was that corruption could
be very harmful to economic growth and within the context of endogenous growth
model, it could significantly erode the gains.
In conclusion, it should be realized that the model developed in this chapter was
only designed to ginger deep thought on the extent of the growth impact of corrupt
practices. Quite clearly, further studies could provide different theoretical valida-
tions and/or empirical tests of the various propositions.
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